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THE MISSION OF PHILISCUS TO GREECE IN 369/8 B.C.*

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The Persians began to using gold for bribery as part of their diplomatic efforts as early as the Persian Wars, and succeeded where diplomacy by itself (i.e., heralds and embassies) failed. In this the Persians followed the model of the Lydians, who also used money to achieve political ends.[1] There were a number of Persian missions that used gold to curry favors of the Greeks in the fifth and fourth century B.C. Their success or failure was also due in part to the general development of Greco-Persian relations and the internal political situation in the Greek world.[2] So, for example, the successful outcome of the mission of Timoc-

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[1] The Lesbian poet Alcaeus mentions the sum of 2,000 *stateres* which his faction obtained from the Lydians to fight against the tyrant Myrsilus of Mytilena (Alc. F. 69 L–P). This may be considered the first known example of an Oriental kingdom that provided a Greek city-state with money to carry out its own political objectives. On Alcaeus' testimony about Lydian-Greek relations: Dale 2011, 15–24.

[2] According to Herodotus (9.2.41), the Persian idea of using gold for purposes of diplomacy with the Greeks was first expressed by the Thebans and then Artabazus on the eve of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. That this had become policy is evident following the Persian Wars in the missions to Greece of Murychides (Hdt. 9.4-5), Arthmius of Zeleia (Dem. 9.41-43; 19.271–272; Aesch. 3.258–259; Din. 2.24–25) and Megabazus (Thuc. 1.109.2–3). Persian gold used to subsidize military needs of the Greeks as it was in the Spartan-Persian treaties of 412–411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.37.5, 58.5–7; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.5), or it was used as bribes/gifts to Greek politicians as it was during Timocrates' mission to Greece in 395 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2; *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2.5) and the

rates of Rhodes to Greece in 395 B.C. convinced the Persians of the efficacy of the use of bribery in diplomacy.[3]

This article focuses on another Persian diplomatic mission to Greece which had a different result. The failure of Philiscus' mission demonstrates that the decline of Persian foreign policy towards the Greeks began with the Peace of Antalcidas (the role of the Great King is noted in Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 121, 175). The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed overview of Philiscus' mission to Greece in order to ascertain the goals of Persian diplomacy with the Greeks in the early 360s B.C.

Xenophon and Diodorus on Philiscus' mission

Xenophon reports on Philiscus' mission after having discussed Athenian-Spartan negotiations at Athens in the spring of 371/0 B.C., the Athenians first encounter with Theban forces, and the arrival of military aid to the Spartans from Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1–22). Although Xenophon's account of Philiscus' mission to Greece and the conference at Delphi (*Hell.* 7.1.27) is shorter than his more detailed description of the conference at Susa several years later (*Hell.* 7.1.33–38),[4] it nonetheless may be considered a starting point for our investigation of Persian influence on Greek affairs in the 360s B.C. and the Greek response to it.[5]

"... Philiscus of Abydus came from Ariobarzanes with a large amount of money. And in the first place he brought together at Delphi the Thebans, their allies, and the Lacedaimonians to negotiate in regard to peace. But when they had arrived there, they did not consult the god at all as to how peace should be brought about, but deliberated for themselves. Since, however, the Thebans would not agree that Messene should be subject to the Lacedaemonians, Philiscus set about collecting a large mercenary force in order to make war on the side of the Lacedaemonians" (translation by C.L. Brownson).

forty talents given to Timagoras (Dem. 19.137; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.9–12). On the use of Persian gold for diplomatic purposes, see: Perlman 1976, 223–233; Lewis 1989, 227–234 = 1997, 369–379; Mitchell 1994, 197–200; 1997, 111–114. On Persian and Greek attitudes towards bribery and gift-giving: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989, 129–146; Harvey 1985, 76–117; Kulesza 1995.

[3] Cook 1990, 69–97; Rung 2004, 413–425 and recently Schepens 2012, 213–241. Many contemporaries considered his efforts to have been the main reason for the outbreak of the Corinthian War.

[4] On Xenophon's description of the conference at Susa, see Bearzot 2011, 21–37.

[5] The most detailed discussion of Philiscus may be found in Heskel 1996, 114–115, 150. She often neglects the epigraphical data, and many of her speculations go beyond what can be soundly suggested on the basis of the sources (e.g., her attempts to reconstruct Philiscus' movements throughout Greece in the period leading to the conference at Delphi, the role of Philiscus in Ariobarzanes' revolt or his assassination).

Xenophon states that Philiscus of Abydus was sent by Ariobarzanes (ἔρχεται Φιλίσκος ᾽Αβυδηνὸς παρ' ᾽Αριοβαρζάνους), the satrap of Dascylium (Hellespontine Phrygia) in 370–360s B.C. under Artaxerxes II, the Great King of Persia. The historian does not inform us of the amount of money Philiscus carried with him as he merely states χρήματα ἔχων πολλά, but it was enough to hire a Greek mercenary force. Ariobarzanes' money might have been used to bribe Greek politicians in the various *poleis* and the priests of Apollo's shrine in Delphi, or it might have been used as an official gift for the shrine. We can say with certainty, however, that Philiscus used at least some of it to subsidize the Spartans in their wars.

Diodorus (15.70.2) offers an alternative version of Philiscus' mission to Greece. He places the mission within the chronological context of the same year as when Lysistratus was eponymous archon, 369/8 B.C. He states:

"Philiscus, who was sent on this mission by King Artaxerxes, sailed to Greece to urge the Greeks to compose their strife and agree to a general peace. All but the Thebans responded willingly; they, however, adhering to their own design, had brought all Boeotia into one confederation and were excluded from the agreement. Since the general peace was not agreed to, Philiscus left two thousand picked mercenaries, paid in advance, for the Lacedaemonians and then returned to Asia" (translation by C. H. Oldfather).

Diodorus thus emphasizes that the peace (εἰρήνη), which in Xenophon's account Philiscus offered to conclude for the Greeks at Delphi, was really a Common Peace (κοινὴ εἰρήνη). The main difference between both accounts concerns the person who was responsible for sending Philiscus to Greece. Xenophon considers that Philiscus was sent by Ariobarzanes, while Diodorus has him sent by Artaxerxes, the Great King of Persia (Φιλίσκος μὲν ὑπ' ᾽Αρταξέρξου τοῦ βασιλέως ἀποσταλεὶς κατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν ῾Ελλάδα).

This discrepancy between the two versions has stimulated discussion among scholars. Robert Moysey supposes that Philiscus' mission was to arrange another common peace and it would seem likely that the impetus for the embassy came from Artaxerxes who directed Ariobarzanes to arrange it.[6] Michael Weiskopf concludes that Philiscus was dispatched to Greece by a local authority (scil. a Persian governor) acting independently of the court at Susa.[7] James Roy also makes Ariobarzanes responsible for this mission.[8] Tim Ryder, however, considers that the accounts are not incompatible as the satrap was the King's officer (this is why Diodorus makes the Great King responsible for the mission), but Philiscus' mission in fact may well have been some private enterprise of Ario-

[6] Moysey 1975, 50.

[7] Weiskopf 1982, 357–358.

[8] Roy 1994, 192. Cf. Parke 1933, 107; Hofstetter 1978, 150; Zahrnt 1983, 270; Burn 1985, 376; Sekunda 1988, 47; Sealey 1993, 81; Mitchell 1997, 127; Heskel 1996, 123.

barzanes.[9] Michael Osborne supposes both Greek historians could be correct: the mission was supposedly concerned with a Common Peace and Philiscus' mission to Greece could have been sponsored by Artaxerxes II; if, on the other hand, Ariobarzanes was responsible for dispatching Philiscus to Greece, then it might indicate that Ariobarzanes was contemplating to rebel from the Great King and used Philiscus' mission as a cover for hiring Greek mercenaries[10]. Finally, Christopher Tuplin notes that there is no proof that Philiscus' mission was part of any secretive preparations for a proposed rebellion by Ariobarzanes[11]. By and large, it is evident that there is significant discrepancy among the scholars about the question of who sent Philiscus to Greece and what were the aims of his visit.[12]

Indeed it may well be that both king and satrap had their own reasons for sending Philiscus. Artaxerxes could have been pursuing the traditional policy towards the Greek city-states beginning with the Peace of Antalcidas in which during a conflict in Greece the Persians tended to support the weaker side (which is precisely the position in which Sparta found herself after the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C.) in order to maintain the balance of power. In this scenario, Artaxerxes would have presented himself as peacemaker. Ariobarzanes, on the other hand, while implementing the King's agenda, could also have used this embassy for his own purposes; namely, to obtain Greek allies some two years prior to his own revolt in 367/6 B.C. According to Nepos (*Datames* 5), Datames who revolted against the King after 370 B.C.,[13] established a secret alliance with Ariobarzanes (*clam cum Ariobarzane facit amicitia*) prior to his rebellion. It is thus reasonable to suppose that Ariobarzanes had already planned his revolt before 367/6 B.C.[14] Moreover, when Ariobarzanes did rebel, he had previously created an alliance with the Spartans (Xen. *Ages*. 2.26), while he and three of his sons were granted Athenian citizenship (Dem. 23.141–143, 202), an act that was unusual to say the least given that he was a Persian.[15] Finally the Athenians in 366/5 B.C. sent a mercenary

[9] Ryder 1965, 80. J. Buckler (1980, 103) and G.L. Cawkwell (2005, 186) also assert that the King sent Philiscus.

[10] Osborne 1973, 539, n. 1.

[11] Weiskopf 1982, 363, 365 argued that Ariobarzanes' dispatch of Philiscus was not an act of rebellion. This satrap simply sought to build up his own political influence in Greece.

[12] Tuplin 1993, 153, n. 22. Seager 1974, 58–59; Ruzicka 1992b, 67; Jehne 1994, 79; Debord 1999, 289; Buckler 2003, 315.

[13] On the date of Datames' revolt: Moysey 1992, 158; Bing 1998, 41 and Sekunda 1988, 51–52 date the revolt of Datames and his secret alliance with Ariobarzanes to 368/7 B.C.

[14] Moysey 1992, 159.

[15] Another example was the citizenship granted by the Athenians to Orontes a Persian satrap in 341/0 B.C.: IG. ii^2.208, line 5. The date of the decree is disputed. Cf. Michael Osborne 1971, 319, 321 argues for 361/0 B.C. Robert Moysey (1987, 93–100) dates it to 349/8 B.C. R. Develin (1988, 75–81) and D. Kelly (1990, 108–109) support the original dating of 341/0 B.C. which was proposed by K. Pyttakis on the basis of the restored name of the archon *Nikomachos*. On Greek

force under the leadership of Timotheus to help Ariobarzanes who had by then revolted, as attested by Demosthenes (15.9). In this regard, one can easily suppose that Ariobarzanes used Philiscus to establish the basis of an alliance with the Spartans and the Athenians prior to his revolt against the King.[16]

Philiscus and the conference at Delphi

Xenophon describes the gathering at Delphi as a peace conference which was attended by representatives from both rival coalitions: the Thebans and their allies, and the Lacedaemonians. Xenophon's statement that Philiscus had brought together all conflicting parties assumes that he had travelled from Thebes to Lacedaemon. Who were the Theban allies at the conference? Xenophon does not tell us. We can assume that they could have been delegates from various Peloponnesian states and thus enemies of the Spartans. Presumably, these states had become Theban allies during the first Boeotian expedition to the Peloponnese under the leadership of Epaminondas. They could have included the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.18).

Xenophon does not mention that any Spartan allies attended the conference at Delphi, including the Athenians, who had negotiated an alliance with Sparta in the congress at Athens one year before (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.14). Tim Ryder considers that the Athenians did not participate in this conference, because they are not mentioned in any of the extant sources.[17] One should keep in mind, however, that the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus of the conference at Delphi are rather brief and do not contain the sort of detailed information that we find in Xenophon's description of the conference at Susa in 367/6 B.C. Moreover, the conference at Delphi concerned a Common Peace and it seems impossible that the Athenians would not have been involved in such discussions. In any event, it is certain that Sparta's enemies prevailed and this resulted in the conference's failure to achieve its stated objective.

In fact this marks the first unsuccessful Persian sponsored attempt to conclude a Common Peace in Greece after the successful attempts in 386, 375, 372, 370 B.C. Why did this happen? It is doubtless that the King's influence upon Greek affairs in earlier years was maintained by Sparta's dominant position in Greece. This was due to the Spartans' position as defenders (προστάται – Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.36) of the peace that accorded them their friendship (φιλία – Isocr.

honors for Persian satraps: Briant 2002, 705. Honors for Greeks in Persian service: Allen 2003, 208–209.

[16] See Heskel 1996, 113, 131–132.

[17] Ryder 1965, 79.

4.149) with Persia. When Sparta lost her hegemony, following the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., the King of Persia was deprived of his ability to dictate Greek affairs.[18]

Delphi was actually an unusual place to hold a peace conference in the fourth century B.C., because the Persians sponsored other such peace congresses in Sparta (375/4 and 372/1 B.C.), Athens (371/0 B.C.), and Thebes (368/7 and 366/5 B.C.). Charles Hamilton thinks that "the selection of such a neutral site is indicative of the judgment that neither Sparta nor Athens was any longer powerful enough to provide a suitable location for a major diplomatic conference."[19] John Buckler considers that the choice of the site for the conference was a sign that the King had now dispensed with a Greek προστάτης of the peace; unlike Sparta and Athens, the capital of those powers, Delphi was a panhellenic sanctuary, legally and customarily independent.[20] P. Stylianou connects the conference with the Athenian decree in honour of Dionysius of Syracuse who played a prominent role in Greek affairs in 380–360s B.C. He states:

"It is tempting to connect, περὶ μὲν τῶν γρα[μ]μά[των ὦ]ν ἔπε]νψεν Διονύσιος [τῆς] ο[ἰκ]οδομ[ίας τοῦ νε]ὼ καὶ τῆς εἰρή[ν]ης, with the congress at Delphi. The temple of Apollo at Delphi had been destroyed in winter 373/2. Like most tyrants, Dionysius took a great interest in the national sanctuaries and he may have urged a congress at Delphi as a means of encouraging the speedy rebuilding of the temple as well as promoting a peace favourable to his friends the Spartans. In addition to Athens, therefore, it is possible that he communicated his ideas to the Persians. It should be added, however, that a national sanctuary was an ideal place for a meeting of Thebans and Spartans. The Thebans would not have gone to Athens and certainly not to Sparta, and the Spartans would hardly have gone to Thebes".[21]

Finally, there is another possibility as to the reason that Delphi have been selected. Perhaps Philiscus and not the Greeks chose the site of the conference, because it had been a panhellenic sanctuary since the Archaic Period and this might have been reason enough to favor the success of the conference.[22] Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.27) indicates that the conference's participants "did not consult the god at all as to how peace should be brought about, but deliberated among themselves."

The Persian proposals to the Greeks at the conference in Delphi may have required the participants to agree to the principles of αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία as

[18] Rung 2008, 40.

[19] Hamilton 1991, 234. Martin Jehne (1994, 180) discusses Delphi as a neutral site for the gathering.

[20] Buckler 2003, 315.

[21] Stylianou 1995, 462. Cf. Jehne 1994, 80, n. 192. Paul Cartledge (1987, 200) frankly states that in 368 the peace congress was held at Delphi on the initiative of Dionysius of Syracuse as well as Artaxerxes.

[22] Roy 1994, 192 considers that Philiscus organized the peace conference at Delphi. Cf. Ruzicka 2012, 125.

they had done at earlier peace congresses in Sparta in 375/4 and 372/1 B.C. and Athens in 371/0 B.C.[23] A new political development was that Messenia had become *de facto* independent in 369 B.C. because of the anti-Spartan activities of the Boeotians in the Peloponnese. The recognition *de jure* of its status was one of the important tasks of Theban diplomacy in 360s B.C. and, if achieved, would have represented yet another blow to Sparta's hegemony in the Peloponnese.[24] The Great King in his support of the Lacedaemonians, however, refused to recognize its autonomous status and instead insisted on its continued subjection to Sparta. The Athenians were they to have in fact participated in the conference might well have supported the Spartan-Persian demand for Messenia's subjection, just as the Spartans supported the Athenian request for control of Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonese, which had been independent of Athens since the end of the Peloponnesian War.[25] The problem with the status of these territories led to diplomatic debates among the Greeks at a number of congresses in which the Persian King was deeply involved.[26] For example, in 367/6 B.C. Artaxerxes II in the conference at Susa was prompted by the Thebans to include in the draft of the Common Peace the condition of autonomy for Messenia (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.36) and proclaimed Amphipolis to be an autonomous city, as well as an ally (Dem. 19.137). As part of the conditions of the Common Peace of 366/5 B.C., the Messenians were won recognition as autonomous (Diod. 15.90.2), while Amphipolis was acknowledged once again by the Persian King as an Athenian possession (Dem. 19.137). The decline of Spartan-Persian influence on shaping Greek affairs in the early of 360s B.C. made it impossible for them to agree on granting the Messenians their autonomy, which led to the failure of peace negotiations at Delphi in 369/8 B.C.

There is no doubt that one of the unofficial tasks of Philiscus during his visit was to hire mercenaries. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.27) does not mention the size of this force, but Diodorus (15.70.2) says there were two thousand mercenaries, though he does not discuss their ethnicity. Some consider that these troops were hired by Philiscus on the King's order as he was about to launch a campaign in Egypt. A similar situation occurred in 375/4 B.C. when the Persian King urged

[23] On the peace of 375/4 B.C.: Diod. 15.38.2; for the peace of 372/1 B.C.: Xen. *Hell*. 6.3.18; and on the peace of 371/0: Xen. *Hell*. 6.5.2. Some works on these peace-treaties may be cited here: Roos 1949, 265–285; Cawkwell 1963, 84–95; Ryder 1965; Buckler 1971, 353–361; Jehne 1994.

[24] On Messenian independence, see Luraghi 2008, 209–230.

[25] Sources: Dem. 7.29; 9.16; 19.253; Aesch. 2.32. Discussion: Jehne 1992, 272–282. Presumably, Athenian demands were recognized by the Greeks and the Persian King at the congress held at Athens in 371/0 B.C., although the precise date and circumstance of when this agreement was reached remains debatable.

[26] Hofstetter 1972, 103 and Adcock & Mosley 1975, 85 lay stress on the conference at Delphi as the first phase of negotiations which had already resumed in Persia.

the Greeks to conclude the Common Peace so that he could get on with the task of hiring Greek mercenaries (Diod. 15.38.1–2);[27] others think that Philiscus acted on orders from Ariobarzanes in preparation for his revolt.[28] Diodorus (15.70.2) tells us that Philiscus gave the mercenaries to the Spartans who presumably employed them in the Tearless Battle in which they defeated the Arcadians in 368 B.C.[29] A further possibility is that Persian money could have been used to support the Spartans, while Ariobarzanes could have used this occasion to seek the diplomatic backing of Athens and Sparta, rather than to hire a Greek cadre of mercenaries.[30]

Philiscus and the Greeks

Philiscus could have been selected to lead the mission, because he might have had friends among the Athenians and Spartans. For example, at the base of the Athenian statue dedicated to Chabrias are fragments that mention his military operations in the Aegean: they refer to his naval victory at Naxos in 376/5 B.C as well as activities at Aianteion at the Hellespont and Mytilene which occurred after the battle of Naxos (*SEG* 19, 204). The inscription also mentions Philiscus and a number of soldiers in vague context, although Anne Pippin Burnett and Colin N. Edmonson note: "It is reasonable to conclude that the operation at the Aianteion was the service which caused the gratitude of Philiskos, and to restore ἐ[ν ᾽Αβύδωι] in the second citation on fragment A."[31] So it is evident that the Persians sent Philiscus because of his relations with the Athenians, who were now Spartan allies.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence of earlier contacts between Philiscus and the Spartans, but it seems highly improbable that he only established relations with the Spartans for the first time during the conference at Delphi. Given the testimony of Xenophon (*Hell*. 5.1.28) that Antalcidas, son of Leon, was a hereditary guest-friend (ξένος ἐκ παλαιοῦ) of Ariobarzanes,[32] one may infer that the satrap intended to use Philiscus to renew relations with the Greeks in 369/8 B.C., although there is no evidence of Antalcidas' participation at the conference. Philiscus' relations with the Athenians are also described by Demosthenes in his speech *Against Aristocrates* (352 B.C.) in which the orator states (23.141–143):

[27] Buckler 1980, 103; Hamilton 1991, 234.
[28] Parke 1933, 89; Zahrnt 1983, 270; Buckler 1977, 141; Sealey 1993, 81; Heskel 1996, 124.
[29] Buckler 1977, 141; Hamilton 1991, 235–236; Ruzicka 2012, 125.
[30] Moysey 1975, 56.
[31] Burnett, Edmonson 1961, 85.
[32] Underhil 1900, 173; Sekunda 1988, 47; Buckler 1977, 141; Mitchell 1997, 126.

"Once upon a time, on a certain occasion, you gave your citizenship to Ariobarzanes, and also, on his account, to Philiscus…. Philiscus…began to use the power of Ariobarzanes by occupying Hellenic cities. He entered them and committed many outrages, mutilating free-born boys, insulting women, and behaving in general as you would expect a man, who had been brought up where there were no laws, and none of the advantages of a free constitution, to behave if he attained to power. Now there were two men in Lampsacus, one named Thersagoras and the other Execestus... These men put Philiscus to death, as he deserved, because they felt it their duty to liberate their own fatherland. Now suppose that one of those orators who spoke on behalf of Philiscus, at a time when he was paymaster of the mercenaries at Perinthus, when he held all the Hellespont, and was the most powerful of viceroys, had then, like Aristocrates today, moved a resolution that whosoever killed Philiscus should be liable to seizure in allied territory. I entreat you to reflect upon the depth of ignominy to which our city would have fallen. Thersagoras and Execestus came to Lesbos and lived there" (translation by A.T. Murray).

Demosthenes notes that Philiscus was μέγιστος … τῶν ὑπάρχων ("the most poweful of viceroys," i.e., satrapal subordinates), and draws attention to his personal behavior. The orator informs us that Philiscus possessed not only his native Abydus, but also Lampsacus, Perinthus, and all the Hellespont. Demosthenes confirms that Philiscus was subordinate to Ariobarzanes and was rewarded by the Athenians with citizenship. He repeats this same information later (23.202):

"In the first place… they (the Athenians) not only claimed that Ariobarzanes and his three sons deserved everything they chose to ask for, but they associated with him two men of Abydus, unprincipled fellows, and bitter enemies of Athens, Philiscus and Agavus" (translation by A.T. Murray).

Demosthenes associates Philiscus with an otherwise unknown Agavus, whom some consider a companion of Philiscus in his voyage to Greece.[33] Michael Weiskopf considers that, during his visit to Greece, Philiscus was accompanied not only by Agavus, but also Diomedon of Cyzicus[34] who is known from Nepos (*Epam*. 4), Plutarch (*Mor*. 193c) and Aelian (*VH* 5.5). The sources attest that Diomedon, having been sent by Artaxerxes II, arrived in Greece with 30,000 darics, and visited Thebes and Athens where he attempted to bribe Epaminondas and to establish relations with Chabrias (Nep. *Epam*. 4). It is certain that Diomedon was a subordinate of Ariobarzanes. Cyzicus, which may also have been controlled by Philiscus, belonged to the satrapy of Dascylium. Diomedon also contacted Chabrias and Epaminondas and, though his activity is not dated precisely by our sources, it may be related to the period before 367/6 B.C. when the Thebans obtained Persian support during the conference at Susa, thus providing a date that is *terminus ante quem*. The *terminus post quem* for Diomedon's mission to Greece is 380/379 B.C., when Chabrias was recalled from Cyprus by the Athenians on Persian demand (Diod. 15.29.3–4). It is tempting to suppose that Diomedon visited Greece with Philiscus to convince the Theban leaders to agree

[33] Judeich 1892, 201; Hofstetter 1978, 150.
[34] Weiskopf 1989, 35; 1982, 358. Cf. Ruzicka 2012, 125.

to a Persian backed peace plan;[35] but there is also the possibility that Diomedon's trip took place before Philiscus' mission. This version of events is preferable, since there are no authors who directly associate Diomedon and Philiscus.

It is important to determine when the individuals involved received their Athenian citizenship: was it before or after Philiscus' mission to Greece? In other words, when he visited Greece in 369/8 B.C. did Philiscus do so as an Athenian citizen? Scholars have proposed different solutions. Some have argued that Philiscus received his citizenship during his mission.[36] John Buckler considers that the Athenians agreed to help Ariobarzanes, and probably granted him and Philiscus Athenian citizenship as a show of solidarity.[37] But others date the event in 365/4 B.C. and connect it with the capture of the Hellespontine cities of Sestus and Crithote by Timotheus (Isocr. 15.111; Nepos. *Timoth*. 1.2–3).[38] It is commonly believed that these cities were given to Timotheus as gifts from Ariobarzanes and Philiscus, though the sources do not state this explicitly.[39] In 366/5 B.C. Ariobarzanes revolted against the King and Timotheus and Agesilaus helped him when he was besieged by Autophradates and Mausolus at Assus.[40] Demosthenes (15.9) says that when the Athenians sent the *strategos* Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes they added to the decree the phrase "provided he does not break the treaty with the King." In theory, of course, the Athenians could have granted honors to a rebel satrap, but there is also a possibility that Ariobarzanes, Philiscus, and Agavus were honored by the Athenian assembly either before Philiscus' mission to Greece and thus when Chabrias' monument was erected in 375 B.C.[41] or immediately after the mission, but prior to Ariobarzanes' revolt. Michael Weiskopf argues that "An earlier date for the granting of citizenship may be more reasonable; citizenship was granted not to a tainted and weakened Ariobarzanes as the result of his service to Athens, but to a strong satrap and his subordinates in recognition of the absence of a disservice, the cutting of the Athenian grain supply."[42] It is difficult to come to any definite conclusion relating to the historical context for when Ariobarzanes and Philiscus were granted citizenship.[43]

[35] González 1997, 15–25.

[36] Olmstead 1948, 409; Burn 1985, 376; Ruzicka 1992a, 60; 1992b, 67; Heskel 1996, 113 n.62, 125.

[37] Buckler 1980, 166.

[38] Judeich 1892, 201 n.1; Moysey 1975, 53 n.31.

[39] Cawkwell 1961, 85 assumes that the Athenians had received Sestus and Crithote in accordance with the conditions of the Common Peace of 366/5 B.C.

[40] Dem. 15.9; Isocr. 15.111; Xen. *Ages*. 2.26–27; Nepos. *Timoth*. 1.

[41] Debord 1999, 299.

[42] Weiskopf 1989, 35.

[43] Raphael Sealey 1993, 81 simply notes: "At an unknown date the Athenians granted citizenship to Ariobarzanes and on his account to Philiskos." Sometimes it is believed that they were granted citizenship on account of Timotheus.

Philiscus and IG. ii². 133

We glean some insight into this matter from the Athenian honor decree for Philiscus son of Lycus granting him προξενία and εὐεργεσία (IG. ii². 133).

προξενία καὶ εὐεργεσί[α]
Φιλίσ[κ]ωι Λύκου αὐτῶ[ι]
καὶ ἐ[κ]γ[ό]νοις Σ[ηστ]ίω[ι].
[ἐ]πὶ [Καλ]λ[ιστράτου ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀ]-
[κ]α[μαν]τίδ[ος ἐνάτης πρυτανείας ἧι Πά]-
[ν]διος Σωκλ[έ]ους ἐ[ξ Οἴου ἐγραμμάτευε]-
[ν]· τῶν προέδ[ρω]ν [ἐπεψήφιζε . . . . 9 . . . .]-
Κονθυλῆθ[ε]ν· ἔ[δοξεν τῶι δήμωι . . 5 . .]-
. ίδης εἶπε[ν]· ἐπ[ειδὴ Φιλίσκος ἀνὴρ ἀγ]-
[α]θὸς ἐγένετο [περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθην]-
αίων μηνύσας τ[ὸν τῶν Βυζαντίων στόλ(?)]-
ον, ἐ[ψ]ηφίσθαι τῶ[ι δήμωι πρόξενον εἶν]-
αι κ[αὶ] εὐεργέτη[ν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ δήμου]
καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ [ἐκγόνους· καὶ ἀναγράψα]-
ι τόδε τὸ ψήφι[σμα τὸν γραμματέα τῆς β]-
ουλῆς ἐν στήληι λ[ιθίνηι καὶ καθαθεῖ]-
ναι ἐν τῆι ἀκροπ[όλει δέκα ἡμερῶν, εἰς]
δὲ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν [δοῦναι τὸν ταμίαν τ]-
οῦ δήμου ΔΔ δραχμ[ὰς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ψηφίσ]-
ματα ἀναλισκ[ο]μ[ένων. ἐπαινέσαι δὲ Φι]-
λίσκον καὶ καλέσα[ι ἐπὶ ξένια εἰς τὸ π]-
ρυτανεῖο[ν] εἰς αὔ[ρ]ι[ον· ἐπιμελεῖσθαι]
δὲ Φιλίσκου τὸν λι[μενόφρουρον(?) τὸν Ἀ]-
θηναίων ἐν Ἑλλησπόν[τωι καὶ τοὺς ἄρχ]-
οντας τοὺς ἐν Ἑλλησπ[όντωι, Ἀθήνησι δ]-
ὲ τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἀεὶ βο[υλεύουσαν καὶ]
τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ὅπως ἃ[ν μὴ ἀδικῆται].

No one has studied this inscription in detail in connection with activity of Philiscus of Abydus. Only John Buckler has suggested that the Philiscus named in the inscription should be identified as the same man who was sent to Greece.[44] The alternative view is that the man honored by the Athenians was a different Philiscus, possibly from Sestus.[45] The problem concerns the date of this decree. Unfortunately, the date that would have been given in the preamble has not survived and editors have had to restore the name of the eponymous archon as *Kallistratos* (line 4), which if true would provide us with a date of 355/354 B.C. The implication, then, is that the reconstructed date of the inscription is too late for our Philiscus, because he was probably dead before 360 B.C.[46] Even if Philiscus had lived until 355 B.C., it is highly unlikely the he would have been granted προξενία and εὐεργεσία after having become an Athenian citizen, because the *terminus ante quem* of his citizenship is based on the death of Ariobarzanes whose own son, Mithridates, betrayed him to the King, who had Ariobarzanes crucified prior to the cessation of the Great Satrapal Revolt of 360/59 B.C.[47] On the other hand, we can propose that proxeny was granted not only to Philiscus, but to Ariobarzanes and his three sons even earlier, which accords well with Demosthenes' statement (23.202) that they received everything they chose to ask for – πάντων ἠξίωσαν ὅσων ἐβουλήθησαν (i.e., not only *citizenship*). The decision of this chronological problem is to propose that the Athenians might (re-)construct a *stela* recording honors for Philiscus only after his death, a decade ago after they actually granted them to him, in order to memorize his services for Athens.[48] The inscription implies that Philiscus son of Lycus was the governor of certain Hellespontine cities (Demosthenes records Philiscus of Abydus, εἶχεν δ' ὅλον τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον: 23.142) and collaborated with the Athenian army. The individuals mentioned as τοὺς ἄρχ]οντας τοὺς ἐν Ἑλλησπ[όντωι (ll. 23–24) might have been Philiscus' lieutenants, like Agavus or Diomedon. It is almost

[44] Buckler 2004, 316, n. 23.

[45] Mosley 1973, 7; Lewis 1986, 77; Gerolymatos 1986, 46–47.

[46] The precise date of Philiscus' death remains unknown and the subject of various scholarly speculation. For example, Weiskopf 1982, 380–381 supposes that "the collapse of Philiscus may come sometime in 365 or later." Heskel 1996, 117, 150 dates Philiscus' death to the spring of 363 B.C.

[47] Xen. *Cyr*. 8.8.4; Arist. *Pol*. 5.8.15; Val. Max. 9.11; Harpocrat. s.v. Ἀριοβαρζάνης: σατράπης Φρυγίας ἀποδειχθεὶς οὗτος παρὰ Ἀρταξέρξου ἀπέστη, ὃς καὶ ἀποστείλας λαὸν τοὺς πολεμήσοντας αὐτῷ καὶ χειρωσάμενος ἐσταύρωσεν.

[48] The obvious parallel for this is the Athenian decree for Heraclides of Clazomenae (IG. i^3.227). On the one hand, this document was inscribed on a *stela* in the 390s, even though the recorded grant of προξενία and εὐεργεσία to Heraclides for his role in negotiating the peace treaty of Epilycus occurred in the 420s (Köhler 1892, 68–78; cf. Harris 1999, 123–128); on the other hand, it was issued after Heraclides had become an Athenian citizen. As Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 6.41) makes clear, Heraclides was rewarded with citizenship before 404/3 B.C.

certain that there were no two men named Philiscus who simultaneously ruled in the Hellespontine region. Philiscus' ethnic in the inscription restored as Σ[ηστ]ίω[ι] may be due to his having resided in Sestus situated on the European side of Hellespont opposite to Abydus at the time of the decree. The advantage of Sestus for the control of the Hellespont was evident already in the antiquity. Herodotus (9.115) sees Sestus as the strongest walled site in the region. Xenophon (*Hell*. 4.8.5) describes Sestus as strong and hard to capture by siege. Finally, Strabo (13.1.22) writes:

"Sestus is the best of the cities in the Chersonesus; and, on account of its proximity to Abydus, *it was assigned to the same governor as Abydus* in the times when governorships had not yet been delimited by continents. Now although Abydus and Sestus are about thirty stadia distant from one another from harbour to harbour, yet the line of the bridge across the strait is short, being drawn at an angle to that between the two cities, that is, from a point nearer than Abydus to the Propontis on the Abydus side to a point farther away from the Propontis on the Sestus side" (translation by H.L. Jones).

Strabo (13.1.22) also cites the historian Theopompus:

"Theopompus says that Sestus is small but well fortified, and that it is connected with its harbour by a double wall of two plethra, and that for this reason, as also on account of the current, it is mistress of the passage" (translation by H.L. Jones).

It is possible that Philiscus held Sestus before it was captured by Timotheus and became an Athenian possession.

Conclusion

Philiscus' mission to Greece belongs in the category of unofficial Persian diplomatic enterprises towards the Greeks since the Greco-Persian Wars.[49] The sources attest that Philiscus was the key agent in Greco-Persian relations at least for a decade (375–365 B.C.) and played a significant role in communications between the Great King of Persia, satrap Ariobarzanes, and the Greeks. So, in combination with information from other sources, Xenophon and Diodorus' reports on Philiscus' mission provide important contemporary testimony about Persian involvement in Greek affairs.

The failure of Philiscus' mission attests the decline of Persian influence in shaping Greek affairs since it was the first unsuccessful Persian diplomatic enterprise at least since the Peace of Antalcidas. So, in answer to the question of why the Greeks had refused to conclude the Persian-sponsored peace of 369/8 B.C., we can point several factors. The defeat of Sparta at Leuctra as well as the political instability of the Persian Empire itself which resulted in the Great Sa-

[49] Rung 2008, 28–50.

trapal revolt of 362/1 B.C. The unintended effect of the rebellion was to decrease the King's capability to involve himself directly in Greek affairs. The Greeks themselves realized this and did not consider Persia to be the "influential force" it had once been in their interstate relations.

Two years later when the Persians supported the Thebans at the conference in Susa (368/7 B.C.), they also were not able to convince the Greeks to conclude the peace on Persian-Theban terms. When the Thebans and their allies defeated the Spartans at Mantinea (362/1 B.C.), the Greeks negotiated the peace treaty without having consulted the King who was otherwise preoccupied with the suppression of the Satrapal Revolt.

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Abstract

The paper is devoted to the mission of Phyliscus to Greece. This mission belonged in the category of unofficial diplomatic enterprises that had been regular in Persian foreign policy since the period of the Greco-Persian Wars. The sources attest that Philiscus was the key agent in the Greco-Persian relations at least for decade (375–365 B.C.) and played a significant role in communications between the Great King of Persia, satrap Ariobarzanes, and the Greeks. The failure of Philiscus' mission attests the decline of Persian influence on Greek affairs since it was the first unsuccessful Persian diplomatic enterprise for some last decades (at least since the Peace of Antalcidas). The reasons for this failure was that the political instability in the Persian Empire in that period resulted in the Great Satrapal revolt in 362/1 B.C. actually decreased the King's capability to be involved actively in Greek affairs and the Greeks themselves realized this and did not consider the Persians as the "influenced force" in their interstate relations.