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CYRUS THE YOUNGER, GREEK ENVOYS, AND THE SO-CALLED TREATY OF BOIOTIOS (409–408 BC)

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At the end of the 5th century BC,¹ the Achaemenid Empire and the Hellenes from European Greece maintained rather strong relations. During the last decade of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), both the Lakedaimonians and the Athenians would send their envoys to Darius II, the Great King (424–404), or to his governors in western Asia Minor, with the hopes of gaining some support and winning the conflict. At the beginning of the last decade of the 5th century, the Greek envoys began their journey to Susa, which coincided with the arrival of the royal son – Cyrus, called the Younger – to Anatolia. The following paper aims to present political relationships between Cyrus and the Greek envoys sent to the Great King, in the years 409–408.² The main focus is on the Athenian and the Lakedaimonian ambassadors.

An increase in the relationship between the Persian Empire under Darius II and the Hellenes from European Greece began at the turn of 413 and 412. At that time, the envoys, who represented the interests of the Achaemenid Empire, arrived in Lakedaimon. They were sent there independently, by Tissaphernes, the governor of Lydia, on the one hand, and by Pharnabazos, the governor of Hellenistic Phrygia, on the other. The mission aimed at convincing the Lakedaimon-

¹ All dates in the article pertain to the events before the birth of Christ.

² Concerning the chronological order of the years 410–407, see Robertson 1980, 282–301. He moved away from the so-called “early” chronology and “late” chronology and applied a satisfying “middle” chronology, adopted herein. A more clear approach to the problem was presented by Krentz 1993, 11–14; Andrewes 1992a, 503–505. Robertson’s chronology was accepted by P. Krentz, with the exception of one modification (see Krentz 1993, 14).

ians to send their armed forces to western and north-western Anatolia respectively, and to oust the Athenian influences from there. Also, the Chians and the Erythraians arrived in Sparta at that time. They were seeking the help of the Lakedaimonians in ending the supremacy of the Athenian Confederacy.³ Their interests could have coincided with those of Tissaphernes.

The decision to ask the Lakedaimonians for help at that particular moment was not accidental. In fact, it was connected with a breakthrough in the ongoing Peloponnesian War, namely, with the failure of the Athenian Sicilian Expedition (415–413).⁴ This created favorable conditions for the Persian Empire to try and take over the Hellenic cities in western and north-western Asia Minor; until that time they had remained under Athenian supremacy. The weakening of the Athenian influences in Anatolia was in the interest of the Lakedaimonians as well. Each strike at the Athenian Confederacy brought them closer to the victory in the devastating Peloponnesian War. When Sparta allied with the Achaemenid Empire against the Athenians, the focus of the ongoing conflict moved to the region of western, and then north-western, Asia Minor. This began the period of the so-called Ionian War (also known as the Dekeleian War: 413–404).

As a result of the decision made in Lakedaimon at the turn of 413 and 412, the Peloponnesian fleet was directed towards western Anatolia, where it started to cooperate with Tissaphernes. Actions taken within the next two years reduced the Athenian influences in this part of Asia Minor. The cooperation between the Achaemenid Empire and the Lakedaimonians as well as their allies, was regulated by three bilateral treaties; two of them were signed in 412 and the third one in 411. Soon after the third treaty had been signed, the gradually deteriorating relationship between Tissaphernes and the Lakedaimonians was terminated. As a result, as early as 411 the Peloponnesian fleet moved to north-western Anatolia to cooperate with Pharnabazos against the Athenians.⁵

When they reached their destination, the Peloponnesian forces, supported by the Achaemenid governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, were defeated by the Athenians in three subsequent naval battles: at Kynossema, Abydos and Kyzikos. The

³ For more information on the visit to Lakedaimon made by Tissaphernes' and Pharnabazos' envoys, as well as by the Chians and the Erythraians, see Mosley 1973, 66; Olmstead 1974, 338–339; Lewis 1977, 87–88; Burn 1985, 343; Dandamaev 1989, 260; Andrewes 1992, 464–465; Keen 1998, 97–99; Briant 2002, 592, 594; Rhodes 2009, 163–164; Wolicki 2009, 212.

⁴ For more details on the Sicilian Expedition, see Bengtson et al. 1969, 180–186; Andrewes 1992b, 446–463; Hammond 1994, 460–474; de Souza 2002, 56–61; Rhodes 2009, 152–161; Wolicki 2009, 199–209.

⁵ For more information on the events in the region of western Anatolia in the years 412–411, see Bengtson et al. 1969, 187–190; Olmstead 1974, 339–342; Lewis 1977, 88–115, 125, 129; Cook 1983, 209; Burn 1985, 343–347; Dandamaev 1989, 260–265; Andrewes 1992, 465–474, 477–478; Hammond 1994, 474–478, 483–484; Keen 1998, 99–102, 108; Briant 2002, 592–597; Rhodes 2009, 164–167; Wolicki 2009, 212–219.

battles took place between the summer of 411 and the spring of 410. The decimated Peloponnesian fleet had to be rebuilt and it was Pharnabazos who came to their aid.⁶ Meanwhile, the Athenians undertook military activities in the Propontis. Their main offensive forces were directed against Kalchedon and Byzantion, located on the Propontis' north-eastern shore, on the Asian and on the European side of the Bosphoros respectively. At that time these cities were beyond the control of the Athenian Confederacy. Thus, it was crucial for the Athenians to restore their supremacy over them and to regain control of the Bosphoros. This way the Athenians could ensure the safe grain supply from Black Sea to Peiraieus.⁷

At the end of 409, the Athenians started the siege of Kalchedon.⁸ They would later reach an agreement concerning this *polis* with Pharnabazos, who was involved in its defense. The Iranian official promised to pay the Athenians twenty talents, and conduct their envoys to the Great King.⁹ The Kalchedonians pledged to pay their normal tribute to the Athenians, and to settle their debt. In return, the Athenians would stop all hostilities against the Kalchedonians, until the Athenian envoys were back from their audience with Darius II.¹⁰ Moreover, Pharnabazos and Alkibiades the Athenian exchanged their oaths as well through their representatives, and next made private pledges of faith with each other.¹¹ The substance of the pledges is not specified in the sources. At the time, the Athenian forces were fighting not only against Kalchedon, but against Byzantion as well. The latter fell into their hands in about 409/408.¹²

The end of 409 or the beginning of 408 is the time when Darius II, the Great King, appointed his son, Cyrus the Younger, to rule over part of the Achaemenid Empire in Anatolia. The prince was about 16 at the time he was sent to Asia Minor.¹³

Cyrus was appointed to be the satrap (*satrapēs*) of Lydia, Great Phrygia and Kappadokia.¹⁴ These regions were probably organized into one administrative

⁶ For more on these events, see Olmstead 1974, 346; Lewis 1977, 125–128; Cook 1983, 209–210; Burn 1985, 347–348; Andrewes 1992, 481–484; Hammond 1994, 484–488; Briant 2002, 593–596; de Souza 2002, 87; Rhodes 2009, 167–170; Wolicki 2009, 219–222.

⁷ See X. *HG* 1.1.35; also Lewis 1977, 125; Andrewes 1992, 483. A list of the abbreviations for classical works and authors available at http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/ljsj/01-authors_and_works.html.

⁸ See X. *HG* 1.3.1–7; D.S. 13.64.2–4, 13.66.1–2; Plu. *Alc.* 29.3–30.1.

⁹ X. *HG* 1.3.8.

¹⁰ X. *HG* 1.3.9; see also D.S. 13.66.3; Plu. *Alc.* 31.1.

¹¹ See X. *HG* 1.3.10–12; also Plu. *Alc.* 31.2.

¹² See X. *HG* 1.3.1–2, 1.3.10, 1.3.14–21; D.S. 13.66.3–67.7; Plu. *Alc.* 31.2–6.

¹³ See Ktes. *Pers.* 51; Plu. *Art.* 2.3; Lewis 1977, 134 with n. 151 and 152; Robertson 1980, 291 with n. 27; Cook 1983, 210; Burn 1985, 349; Ruzicka 1985, 207 with n. 12; Andrewes 1992, 489 with n. 51; Krentz 1993, 125; Schmitt 1993; Keen 1998, 103; Keen 1998a, 89.

¹⁴ X. *An.* 1.9.7; see also X. *An.* 1.1.2; Olmstead 1974, 347; Lewis 1977, 119; Dandamaev 1989, 266; Stronk 1990–1991, 123.

unit, with Cyrus at the helm.¹⁵ The vastness of the territory under Cyrus' rule (from the Aegean to the Euphrates) was worthy of a royal son.¹⁶ We are also informed that the Iranian prince took control over all coastal regions (*arksōn pantōn tōn epi thalattē*).¹⁷ Xenophon included this information after he had described the events in the Hellespont and the Propontis.¹⁸ This message is also presented in the context of the meeting between Cyrus and Pharnabazos,¹⁹ the Persian governor of the Hellespontine Phrygia. Thus, it is possible that the expression *arksōn pantōn tōn epi thalattē* refers to Hellespontine Phrygia, included under the rule of the Iranian prince. This suggests that Cyrus controlled presumably territories of the whole Anatolian Peninsula, including both the inland and the coastal regions.

Moreover, Darius II appointed Cyrus commander (*stratēgos*) of all troops assembled in the plain of Kastolos,²⁰ located in Lydia, east of Sardis. Thus, the prince had the armed forces of the region at his disposal. We also know that Cyrus was given the title *karanos*, rendered in Greek by the term *kyrios*.²¹ Not much is known about the role and the competence of *karanos* in the Achaemenid Empire, hence it is difficult to determine what exactly this function entailed.²² Nevertheless, it was connected with the military sphere.²³ In all likelihood, Cyrus was the commander-in-chief of all Achaemenid troops in Anatolia.²⁴ Both the garrison troops in capital strongholds of Asia Minor as well as the contingents in Anatolian satrapies were under his command. Garrisons were commanded by *phrouarchs* (*phrouarchoi*), and armed forces in satrapies were commanded by *chiliarchs* (*chiliarchoi*).²⁵ Most probably, both *phrouarchs* and *chiliarchs* re-

¹⁵ See Ruzicka 1985, 204, 206–207 (he dates the appointment of Cyrus as satrap back to 407).

¹⁶ See Cook 1985, 269; Ruzicka 1985, 207; Tuplin 1987, 142 with n. 19.

¹⁷ X. *HG* 1.4.3.

¹⁸ See X. *HG* 1.2.15–17, 1.3.1–21.

¹⁹ See X. *HG* 1.4.1–7.

²⁰ X. *An.* 1.1.2, 1.9.7. See Andrewes 1971, 208; Cook 1985, 269; Hirsch 1985, 10–11; Dandamaev 1989, 266; Dandamaev/Lukonin 1989, 222–223; Weiskopf 1990; Krentz 1993, 126; Kuhrt 2007, 343; Olbrycht 2013, 66.

²¹ X. *HG* 1.4.3. See Lewis 1977, 131 with n. 136; Ruzicka 1985, 206–207.

²² For more on the position of *karanos* in the Achaemenid Empire, as well as on the possible origin and the interpretation of the term, see Widengren 1969, 106; Cook 1985, 269; Shahbazi 1986; Weiskopf 1987; Dandamaev/Lukonin 1989, 222; Weiskopf 1990; Schmitt 1993; Keen 1998a, 88–95; Olbrycht 2011, 230; Hyland 2013, 1–5; Olbrycht 2013, 65–68.

²³ See Widengren 1969, 106; Ruzicka 1985, 204; Dandamaev 1989, 266; Schmitt 1993; Olbrycht 2011, 230; Hyland 2013, 2–5; Olbrycht 2013, 66–68.

²⁴ See Bengtson et al. 1969, 192; Olmstead 1974, 347; Dandamaev 1989, 266; cf. Keen 1998a, 90.

²⁵ For succinct information on the military system in Achaemenid satrapies, see Olbrycht 2010, 109.

ported back to the Iranian prince. Not only did Cyrus control the land forces, but also the fleet was presumably at his disposal.²⁶

When heading for Asia Minor, Cyrus carried a letter (*epistolē*) bearing the royal seal (*basileion sphragisma*). The letter contained the information that Cyrus had been appointed by the Great King and confirmed his position as *karanos*.²⁷ This information had been spread by the Achaemenid messengers (*aggeloi*),²⁸ who brought it to the centers and governors in Anatolia.²⁹ In the spring of 408, the news about Cyrus' arrival reached the regions east of Gordion,³⁰ the former capital city of Phrygia.³¹

Meanwhile, a group of envoys, from the city of Kyzikos, on the south coast of the Propontis, left for Susa to meet with the Great King.³² This embassy consisted of: the Athenians: Dorotheos, Philokydes, Theogenes, Eurypolemos and Mantitheus; the Argives: Kleostratos and Pyrrolochos; the Lakedaimonians: Pasippidas and others; and the Syrakusans: Hermokrates and his brother Proxenos.³³ Thus, among the envoys there were the representatives of both sides of the ongoing Peloponnesian War. One may suspect that both the Athenians and the Lakedaimonians wished to receive financial support from the Achaemenid Empire in the ongoing conflict, so that they could achieve victory. Kyzikos as the starting point of the journey was suggested by Pharnabazos,³⁴ the governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, where the city was located. Also, he offered to personally escort the envoys to the Great King.³⁵ This was in line with the oath he pledged to the Athenians at the end of 409, when both parties reached the agreement regulating the problem of Kalchedon.

After leaving Kyzikos, Pharnabazos and the Greek envoys stopped in Gordion. They spent the winter there, and at the beginning of the spring of 408 they set off again, heading towards Susa.³⁶ Their goal was to commence negotiations with Darius II. Someplace east of Gordion, they met the Lakedaimonian ambas-

²⁶ See Dandamaev/Lukonin 1989, 222.

²⁷ X. *HG* 1.4.3. See Krentz 1993, 125–126; Briant 2002, 600.

²⁸ See X. *HG* 1.4.2–3.

²⁹ For more succinct information on the activity of Achaemenid messengers, see Kuhrt 2007a, 732, 754–755.

³⁰ X. *HG* 1.4.2; Robertson 1980, 285.

³¹ For more general information on Gordion in the time of the Achaemenid Empire, see Krentz 1993, 124; Kuhrt 2007, 342.

³² For more information on Greek embassies and ambassadors sent to the Achaemenid Empire in the 5th century, see Mosley 1973, *passim*; Miller 1997, 109–133.

³³ X. *HG* 1.3.13.

³⁴ X. *HG* 1.3.13.

³⁵ See X. *HG* 1.3.8–9, 1.3.13–14; Plu. *Alc.* 31.1.

³⁶ See X. *HG* 1.4.1–2; Mosley 1973, 71; Olmstead 1974, 347; also Burn 1985, 348; Briant 2002, 593, who date this event back to spring 407.

sadors and the Achaemenid messengers (*aggeloi*), who were traveling in the opposite direction. The Greek envoys learned from them that Cyrus had arrived in Anatolia, and that the Great King had already granted to the Lakedaimonians all their requests.³⁷ Both groups of envoys might have traveled along the same Royal Road, which connected Susa and Sardis. One of the stops on the route was probably in Gordion.³⁸ The above mentioned Achaemenid messengers (*aggeloi*) used to travel along the same route.

The Lakedaimonian ambassadors returning from the Great King included Boiotios and his companions.³⁹ We do not know when they were sent to Darius II.⁴⁰ It is possible that they took up their journey in 410, soon after the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet in the battle at Kyzikos,⁴¹ fought in 410.⁴² We know that after the defeat at Kyzikos, the crew of the Peloponnesian fleet took shelter in the camp of Pharnabazos.⁴³ New ships would soon be built, and timber was transported from Mount Ida. The construction of ships took place in Antandros at the expense of the governor of Hellespontine Phrygia.⁴⁴ Perhaps, in these circumstances, Boiotios and his companions left to meet the Great King. They definitely did not travel together with Pharnabazos, for he was occupied with the events in Kalchedon at the time.⁴⁵ However, he might have appointed a person responsible for escorting the envoys to Darius II.

In the face of the devastating defeat at Kyzikos, the most likely purpose of Boiotios' mission was to negotiate with the Great King of Sparta's future actions as well as the conditions of cooperation with the Achaemenid Empire. The course of negotiations between Darius II and the embassy led by Boiotios is unknown. However, some substantive decisions had probably been made. The issue of financing the Peloponnesian fleet, paid with Achaemenid appropriations, might have been regulated. Most probably, it had been decided that a sum of thirty *minai* (i.e., three thousand *drachmai*) would be spent a month

³⁷ X. *HG* 1.4.2–3. See Burn 1985, 348; Dandamaev 1989, 267; Andrewes 1992, 489 (dates the event back to spring 407).

³⁸ See Young 1963, 348–350. For more information on the Royal Road from Susa to Sardis, see Lewis 1977, 56–57; Dandamaev/Lukonin 1989, 210; Briant 2002, 357–359, 361–362; Kuhrt 2007a, 737, 739; Olbrycht 2010, 104; Waters 2014, 111–112.

³⁹ X. *HG* 1.4.2. See Hofstetter 1978, 39.

⁴⁰ See Robertson 1980, 290–291 with n. 25.

⁴¹ See Krentz 1993, 124–125.

⁴² Dating of the battle at Kyzikos follows Lewis 1977, 125; Robertson 1980, 282; Burn 1985, 347. M.A. Dandamaev dates the battle at Kyzikos back to 409 (Dandamaev 1989, 266).

⁴³ D.S. 13.51.7–8.

⁴⁴ See X. *HG* 1.1.24–26; Lewis 1977, 127; Burn 1985, 347–348; Andrewes 1992, 489; Wolicki 2009, 221.

⁴⁵ See X. *HG* 1.1.26.

on each ship, regardless of the number of ships the Lakedaimonians might have requested.⁴⁶

Perhaps the negotiations also defined the status of Greek cities in Asia Minor; they would have remained autonomous provided that a tribute (*phoros*) was paid to the Achaemenid Empire.⁴⁷

Such might have been the provisions of the so-called Treaty of Boiotios, negotiated by Darius II and the Lakedaimonian ambassadors. It was concluded most likely at the turn of 409 and 408⁴⁸ in Susa. The treaty made it possible for the Persian Empire, as well as the Lakedaimonians and their allies, to continue their joint fight against the Athenian Confederacy. It is not clear whether Cyrus participated in the negotiation of the treaty. Nevertheless, we may suspect that, as the future ruler of Anatolia, he must have been aware of the results of the negotiations, and most likely was obliged to abide by them.

The subsequent events imply that the treaty negotiated between Darius II and the embassy led by Boiotios was connected with the Great Kings' decision to send Cyrus to Asia Minor. Xenophon states that in the ongoing conflict among the Hellenes, the Iranian prince would have sided with the Lakedaimonians.⁴⁹ His account suggests this was the fundamental reason why the rule over Anatolia was bestowed on Cyrus. There is no doubt that the fight against the Athenian Confederacy was a high priority for Darius II, and for the Achaemenid Empire in general. The cooperation with Lakedaimon in this respect would increase the chances for success. The moment Cyrus was sent to Asia Minor, he became responsible for all actions taken against the Athenian Confederacy; he was also the person to refer to in this matter.⁵⁰ This might have been decided during the negotiations between Darius II and the embassy led by Boiotios.

There might also have been some other reasons behind the Great Kings' decision to send the prince to Anatolia, apart from the Greek problem and the events that were taking place in western and north-western Asia Minor at that time. The troubles caused by recalcitrant Anatolian mountain tribes, such as the Pisidians, the Mysians, or the Lykaonians, probably independent from the Achaemenid Empire, might have been among these reasons. When Cyrus arrived in Asia Minor, he was supposed to address this issue too. Furthermore, sending

⁴⁶ See X. *HG* 1.5.1–5; Lewis 1977, 124; also Andrewes 1992, 489; Krentz 1993, 125.

⁴⁷ See Lewis 1977, 117–125; also Stronk 1990–1991, 121–122; Andrewes 1992, 489; Krentz 1993, 125; Rhodes 2009, 170–171. Concerning any clarifications in this matter, see Tuplin 1987, 133–153. Keen 1998, 103 as well as Cartledge 2002, 227 doubt whether the so-called Treaty of Boiotios really existed.

⁴⁸ D.M. Lewis dates the event back to winter 408/407 (Lewis 1977, 125).

⁴⁹ X. *HG* 1.4.3. See Stronk 1990–1991, 123.

⁵⁰ See X. *HG* 1.5.1–8, 1.6.6–7,10, 2.1.10–14; D.S. 13.70.1–3, 13.104.3–4; Plu. *Lys.* 4.1–4, 6.5–6, 9.1–2.

the prince to Anatolia could have ensued from the political affairs in the palace, within the closest circles of the Great King.⁵¹ Despite of these other factors, the main reason the rule in Asia Minor was bestowed on Cyrus should be regarded the fight against the Athenian Confederacy, undertaken together with the Lakedaimonians.

Boiotios' diplomatic mission definitely made it possible to arrange direct contact between Cyrus and the Lakedaimonians. The exchange of information, along with the impressions from the meeting, could shape the prince's opinion on the Lakedaimonians, and on other Hellenes as well. What is more, he could see the Peloponnesian War from the Lakedaimonian perspective.

Someplace east of Gordion, the news about the results of the negotiations between Darius II and the embassy led by Boiotios reached the Athenian envoys traveling to Susa. Soon enough, they saw Cyrus heading towards Sardis. This made them want to see the Great King even more. Otherwise, they would return to the Athenian fleet.⁵² We do not know what they intended to offer Darius II. However, it is a fact that in the ongoing war among the Hellenes, the Great King sided with the Lakedaimonians.⁵³ By order of Cyrus, the Athenian envoys were not permitted to see Darius II. The Iranian prince did not allow them to return to their fleet either. Xenophon mentions that the prince wanted to keep the Athenians in the dark.⁵⁴ The Lakedaimonians probably wanted the same. Perhaps they themselves suggested that the Athenian ambassadors should be detained.⁵⁵

Cyrus' decision to detain the Athenian envoys can be interpreted as clear proof of his cooperation with Sparta. The Athenian ambassadors were released after three years.⁵⁶ During this time, they presumably remained under Pharnabazos' custody, who followed the prince's order and did not allow them to see the Great King or to return to their fleet.⁵⁷

As already mentioned, the Athenian envoys, who in 409 left Kyzikos to reach Susa, were: Dorotheos, Philokydes, Theogenes, Euryptolemos and Mantitheos.⁵⁸ They were not sent from Athens, but most probably were delegated by

⁵¹ For reasons that could have troubled Darius II and triggered the decision to send Cyrus to Anatolia, see Lewis 1977, 55–56, 133–135; Wolski 1986, 49–50; Tuplin 1987, 140–142; Head 1992, 9; Keen 1998, 102–103; Keen 1998a, 90–91; Briant 2002, 600; Olbrycht 2010, 92; Hyland 2013, 2.

⁵² See X. *HG* 1.4.4.

⁵³ See X. *HG* 1.4.2–3; Lewis 1977, 131–133; Robertson 1980, 290; Dandamaev 1989, 266; de Souza 2002, 87; Wolicki 2009, 224; Shahbazi 2012, 130.

⁵⁴ X. *HG* 1.4.5. See Mosley 1973, 18–19, 82–83; Robertson 1980, 291; Krentz 1993, 126; Hammond 1994, 488.

⁵⁵ See Krentz 1993, 126.

⁵⁶ X. *HG* 1.4.7.

⁵⁷ See X. *HG* 1.4.5–7.

⁵⁸ See X. *HG* 1.3.13.

the Athenians stationed in the Propontis.⁵⁹ We do not know much about Dorotheos and Philokydes.⁶⁰ The name Theogenes is listed among the so-called Thirty Tyrants,⁶¹ who were installed in Athens after the end of the Peloponnesian War. This Theogenes, and the one who left Kyzikos as an envoy to reach Susa under Pharnabazos' conduction, might be one and the same person.⁶² The rules of the Thirty in Athens were installed in summer, probably in July 404.⁶³ Thus, after three years spent under Pharnabazos' custody, Theogenes could still have had time to return to Athens and join the Thirty. July 404 would be therefore *terminus ante quem* for his release from Iranian custody.

A man named Mantitheos was mentioned in the context of the trial of the Hermokopidai in Athens in 415 as a person directly involved in the case. He might be identified with Mantitheos, a member of the Athenian embassy heading from Kyzikos to Susa in the period 409–408. Also, the same Mantitheos was probably engaged in the daring escape from Sardis – a story told by Xenophon.⁶⁴ The historian relates that Mantitheos had been captured in Karia and was held captive in the capital of Lydia. Details of his activities in Karia, as well as the reasons for his arrest, are unknown. However, we do know that one night Mantitheos fled Sardis on horseback and headed for Klazomenai. He did this together with Alkibiades, another Athenian detained in the capital of Lydia at that time.⁶⁵ This event can be dated back to 411,⁶⁶ so it had happened before Mantitheos left Kyzikos and headed for Susa as an envoy. It is also known that Mantitheos was a member of the Athenian fleet active in the waters of the Hellespont in 408.⁶⁷ This information is perplexing. If in 408, most likely in the spring of the year,⁶⁸ Pharnabazos, following Cyrus' order, detained the Athenian envoys traveling from Kyzikos to Susa, among them Mantitheos, and held them under custody for three years, then Mantitheos could not have been present in the waters of the Hellespont in 408.⁶⁹

The same problem, as in the case of Mantitheos, is connected with Eurypolemos, another member of the Athenian embassy traveling from Kyzikos to

⁵⁹ See Mosley 1973, 56.

⁶⁰ See Hofstetter 1978, 54, 151; Krentz 1993, 121.

⁶¹ See X. *HG* 2.3.2.

⁶² See Hofstetter 1978, 176; Krentz 1993, 121.

⁶³ For more on the appointment and the rules of the Thirty in Athens, see Anderson 1974, 47–60; Hammond 1994, 523–527; Lewis 2006, 33–36; de Souza 2002, 91–92; Rhodes 2009, 299–302; Węcowski 2009, 373–374.

⁶⁴ Hofstetter 1978, 123; Krentz 1993, 95.

⁶⁵ See X. *HG* 1.1.9–10; Plu. *Alc.* 27.5–28.1; Burn 1985, 348; Dandamaev 1989, 265.

⁶⁶ Hofstetter 1978, 123.

⁶⁷ See D.S. 13.68.2; Krentz 1993, 95.

⁶⁸ N. Robertson dates this event back to spring 408 (see Robertson 1980, 285, 286).

⁶⁹ See Hofstetter 1978, 123.

Susa. He was presumably the son of Peisianax, and the cousin of Alkibiades,⁷⁰ a prominent Athenian, the same who was held captive in Sardis, and together with Mantitheos fled to Klazomenai. Euryptolemos is mentioned in the context of the oaths, discussed above, exchanged by Pharnabazos and Alkibiades, and ensuing from the Athenian activities in the Propontis in 409.⁷¹ As pointed out, Pharnabazos and Alkibiades did not meet in person at that time, but made their pledges through their representatives, the Iranian in Kalchedon and the Athenian in Chrysopolis. Euryptolemos was one of the two representatives serving Alkibiades.⁷² Soon after this event, the Greek envoys, conducted by Pharnabazos, embarked on journey from Kyzikos to Susa (409–408); Euryptolemos was among them.⁷³ The problem with Euryptolemos results from the fact that he was in Athens in late spring 407; this is the time when Alkibiades returned to the city.⁷⁴ He was also in Athens during the trail of the Athenian generals after the battle at Arginousai,⁷⁵ fought in the summer of 406.⁷⁶ Thus, if Euryptolemos was in Athens in 407 and 406, then he could not have spent three years under the custody of Pharnabazos, who, in 408 detained the Athenian ambassadors.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned discrepant data, it seems that from among the five Athenian envoys detained by Cyrus' order, two of them – Mantitheos and Euryptolemos – could not have been held under the Iranian custody for three years. A few solutions to the problem come to mind.

As already stated, Mantitheos and Alkibiades fled Sardis together in 411. Perhaps, Mantitheos managed to escape once more, this time with Euryptolemos. However, we do not know in what city the Athenian ambassadors were held by the Iranians. Additionally, their successful escape would surely have been noticed by sources. Still, there is no mention of it anywhere, hence it is difficult to accept it really happened.

Another option would be to correct Xenophon's account. Perhaps the time when the Athenian envoys were detained under Pharnabazos' custody lasted

⁷⁰ Krentz 1993, 121.

⁷¹ See X. *HG* 1.3.1–12. For more details on the Athenian activity in the Propontis in 409, see Lewis 1977, 128–129; Andrewes 1992, 486–487; Rhodes 2009, 170; Wolicki 2009, 223 – date the events back to 408, applying the chronology different than the one adopted by Robertson 1980, 282–301. Concerning chronology, see this article, n. 2.

⁷² X. *HG* 1.3.11–12.

⁷³ See X. *HG* 1.3.13; Hofstetter 1978, 67.

⁷⁴ See X. *HG* 1.4.18–19; Krentz 1993, 121. Robertson 1980, 285 dates the return of Alkibiades to Athens back to spring 407. Andrewes 1992, 487; Wolicki 2009, 223 date it back to June 407.

⁷⁵ See X. *HG* 1.7.12, 16–34; Krentz 1993, 121.

⁷⁶ Dating of the battle according to Robertson 1980, 282. A. Andrewes dates the battle back to ca. August 406 (Andrewes 1992, 503).

three months not three years.⁷⁷ If that was the case, then it would be possible for Manti-theos to be present in the waters of the Hellespont in 408, and for Euryptolemos to be in Athens in 407⁷⁸ and 406. According to Xenophon, the Athenian envoys were released by Cyrus at the intercession of Pharnabazos. The reason for this was that according to the oath, if Pharnabazos had failed to take the ambassadors to the Great King, he would have had to send them back to their fleet.⁷⁹ Pharnabazos sent the envoys to Ariobarzanes,⁸⁰ who took them to Kios, located in Mysia on the south-eastern coast of the Propontis. From there, the Athenian envoys sailed to their camp,⁸¹ probably located in the Hellespont,⁸² where the Athenian ships were still active.⁸³ The change in Xenophon's text would mean the detention and the release of the Athenian ambassadors would have taken place in 408, probably still in the first half of the year. Consequently, the above mentioned chronological contradiction concerning Manti-theos and Euryptolemos would be removed.

Another solution, not involving a change in Xenophon's text, is possible as well. The historian states that the Athenians: Dorotheos, Philokydes, Theogenes, Euryptolemos and Manti-theos, together with Pharnabazos and other Greeks, set off from Kyzikos.⁸⁴ However, he does not mention who exactly of the Athenian envoys was detained by Pharnabazos acting on Cyrus' order.⁸⁵ It is possible that only Dorotheos, Philokydes and Theogenes were among the detained ambassadors, and not Euryptolemos or Manti-theos. Euryptolemos and Manti-theos could have left the embassy before Cyrus ordered Pharnabazos to detain the Athenians. The news coming from the east might have triggered the decision of the two Athenians to leave the other envoys. That is, when they had learned the results of the negotiations between Darius II and the Lakedaimonian ambassadors led by Boiotios, and found out about Cyrus heading for Anatolia, Euryptolemos and Manti-theos embarked on the journey to return to their fleet. The commanders of the Athenian fleet had to be informed about the developing events. Alkibiades was an important person there, and Euryptolemos and Manti-theos were his friends. Both of them realized the importance of the information they carried,

⁷⁷ See Krentz 1993, 126. The three-year detention of the Athenian envoys occurs in Mosley 1973, 18, 82–83; Hofstetter 1978, 54, 67, 123, 151, 176; Robertson 1980, 285, 286; Dandamaev 1989, 267; Hammond 1994, 488; Briant 2002, 600; Wolicki 2009, 224.

⁷⁸ Krentz 1993, 126.

⁷⁹ X. *HG* 1.4.7.

⁸⁰ Ariobarzanes could have been a brother or a son of Pharnabazos, see Burn 1985, 349; Kuhrt 2007, 343.

⁸¹ X. *HG* 1.4.7.

⁸² Cf. Krentz 1993, 126, who points on Samos.

⁸³ See D.S. 13.68.1–2.

⁸⁴ X. *HG* 1.3.13.

⁸⁵ See X. *HG* 1.4.4–7.

and knew it was crucial to communicate it to Alkibiades and to other commanders. As soon as the news coming from the east reached them, they left the other envoys and Pharnabazos, probably at the beginning of spring 408, after they had left Gordion. The other Athenian envoys continued the journey, hoping to take up negotiations with the Great King. Not long after, by order of Cyrus, their journey to Susa and the trip back to their fleet were detained.

Meanwhile, Euryptolemos and Mantitheos had joined the Athenian fleet in the Propontis or in the Hellespont, and informed their countrymen about Boiotios and his companions' successful mission and about Cyrus moving to Anatolia. Mantitheos (and Diodoros) were placed in command over part of the ships, while the commanders of the fleet left the Hellespont.⁸⁶ Alkibiades sailed to Samos, Thrasyboulos to Thrace, and Thrasyllus to Athens.⁸⁷

As mentioned earlier, Euryptolemos was in Athens when Alkibiades returned there in late spring 407. It is possible that he arrived in Athens together with the fleet sailing from the Hellespont under the command of Thrasyllus. Consequently, he could have greeted Alkibiades in Athens in 407,⁸⁸ and in 406, could have attended the trial of the Athenian generals after the battle at Arginousai.⁸⁹ Moreover, after they had returned from the Hellespont to Athens, both Thrasyllus and Euryptolemos could have spread the news about the results of the negotiations between the Great King and the Lakedaimonian ambassadors led by Boiotios, as well as about Darius II sending Cyrus to Anatolia.

The other members of the Athenian embassy to Susa – Dorotheos, Philokydes and Theogenes – spent three years under the custody of Pharnabazos. After that time, by order of Cyrus, they were released and granted permission to return to their camp,⁹⁰ probably somewhere in the region of the Hellespont. It had happened presumably before the battle at Aigospotamoi (late summer 405⁹¹), when the Athenian fleet was still active in this region. It is possible that they joined the Athenian fleet right before the battle. Following the defeat at Aigospotamoi, Theogenes, just like many other Athenians, could be back in Athens. Then, in the summer of 404 he took part in the rules of the Thirty.⁹²

⁸⁶ See D.S. 13.68.1–2.

⁸⁷ See X. *HG* 1.4.8–10; D.S. 13.68.2 (trans. by P. Green 2010, with n. 76); Andrewes 1953, 2–5 (provides a short characteristics of the listed generals); Robertson 1980, 286–289; Krentz 1993, 127–128.

⁸⁸ See X. *HG* 1.4.18–19.

⁸⁹ See X. *HG* 1.7.12, 16–34.

⁹⁰ See X. *HG* 1.4.7.

⁹¹ Dating of the battle at Aigospotamoi by Robertson 1980, 286. P. Briant dates the battle back to September 405 (Briant 2002, 600). On the battle of Aigospotamoi, see Andrewes 1992, 494–495; de Souza 2002, 89.

⁹² See X. *HG* 2.3.2.

Among five Athenian envoys, who together with Pharnabazos and other Greek ambassadors left Kyzikos to reach Darius II, there were only three who could have had direct contact with Cyrus. The envoys included: Dorotheos, Philokydes and Theogenes. When Theogenes came back to Athens, he surely brought to the city the news about his three-year stay among the Iranians. He could share the information about Cyrus, Pharnabazos and Ariobarzanes with his countrymen, along with information about the Achaemenid Empire in general.⁹³ Xenophon, the Athenian historian, as well as Thukydides, could have been among those who received this news.⁹⁴ From the perspective of the Iranian prince, the Athenian envoys could be in turn a valuable source of information on the Athenians, and on other Hellenes as well. Just like before when, during Boiotios' diplomatic mission, the prince had a chance to meet the Lakedaimonians and learn their view on the Peloponnesian War, similarly he could now get to know the Athenian perspective.

Despite the fact that Cyrus probably met with the Athenian envoys, detained on his order in spring 408, there is no evidence that the prince began any diplomatic negotiations with them. In the ongoing war among the Hellenes, the Achaemenid Empire sided with the Lakedaimonians and the Iranian prince had no intention to change that. Boiotios and his companions, returning from Susa, received all they expected from Darius II, whereas the Athenians had to rely on themselves in the proceeding military actions. Due to the fact that Mantitheos and Euryptolemos had left the Greek envoys heading for Susa, as suggested above, the commanders of the Athenian fleet, headed by Alkibiades, learned about the decisions made in the east relatively early. The information about Boiotios' successful mission, and about sending Cyrus to Anatolia, could have influenced the subsequent decisions made by the Athenian side.

The so-called Treaty of Boiotios, and Cyrus taking control of Asia Minor, strengthened the former relations between the Achaemenid Empire and the Lakedaimonians as well as their allies. Ultimately, this led to the fall of the Athenian Confederacy. The Lakedaimonians, having at their disposal the financial support offered by the Iranian prince, were able to face the Athenians at sea once more. In the period 407–405, the ships of both warring parties fought against each other by the western and north-western coast of Anatolia in battles at Notion, Arginousai and Aigospotamoi. The Athenians won at Arginousai. The Peloponnesian fleet, funded with the Achaemenid money, succeeded at Notion

⁹³ On the role of Greek envoys in the exchange of information as well as objects connected with Persians and the Achaemenid Empire, see Miller 1997, 109–133, especially: 109, 127–130, 133.

⁹⁴ Thukydides is known to survive the end of the Peloponnesian War (404); and he probably died in Athens (see Anderson 1974, 61–62). So it is possible that he was there when Theogenes and other envoys, who at the end of 409 left Kyzikos to see the Great King, returned to their home *polis*.

and Aigospotamoi. The latter effectively ended the war, and Athens surrendered in 404.⁹⁵ Without doubt, this resulted from the strong support, particularly financial, provided to the Lakedaimonians by the Achaemenid Empire, and especially by Cyrus the Younger, who was delegated by the Great King to oversee actions directed at destroying the Athenian Confederacy.

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⁹⁵ For more on the events of the last four years of the Peloponnesian War, see Bengtson et al. 1969, 192–194; Olmstead 1974, 347–348; Lewis 1977, 136; Cook 1983, 210–211; Burn 1985, 350–352; Dandamaev 1989, 267–269; Stronk 1990–1991, 123–125; Andrewes 1992, 489–496; Hammond 1994, 488–494; Keen 1998, 103–104; Briant 2002, 600; de Souza 2002, 87–89; Rhodes 2009, 171–175; Wolicki 2009, 223–229.

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Abstract

At the end of the 5th century BC the Persian Empire and the Hellenes from European Greece maintained rather strong relations. During the so-called Ionian War (413–404 BC), both the Lakedaimonians and the Athenians would send their envoys to Darius II, the Great King of Persia, or to his governors in western Asia Minor, with the hopes of gaining some support and winning the ongoing war. At the beginning of the last decade of the 5th century BC the Greek ambassadors began their journey to Susa, which coincided with the arrival of the royal son, Cyrus the Younger, to Anatolia. The subject-matter of the paper is to present political relationships between the Iranian prince and the Greek envoys, Athenian and Lakedaimonian in particular, sent to the Great King in the years 409–408 BC.