Cyrus the Younger in Syria and Mesopotamia, Abrokomas, and the Great King’s Defensive Strategy (401 BC)

Abstract

This article analyzes the strategic role of Abrokomas, a commander in the service of Artaxerxes II (404-359 BC), during the revolt of Cyrus the Younger in 401 BC and the subsequent campaign in Syria and Mesopotamia. Focusing on the movement and actions of Abrokomas and his forces, the study re-examines ancient literary sources (notably Xenophon, Diodorus, and others) alongside recent scholarship and epigraphic data to clarify his position and function within the Achaemenid defense. The article challenges earlier views that saw Abrokomas as a disloyal or opportunistic actor and instead situates him as part of a deliberate royal strategy. Initially tasked with military operations in Phoenicia and possibly Egypt, Abrokomas was redirected to Mesopotamia to anticipate and block potential routes of Cyrus and his army. The article reconstructs the routes taken by Persian forces, evaluates the debated positions of key satraps (notably the identification and role of Belesys versus Abrokomas as satrap of Syria), and situates these military maneuvers within the wider logistical framework of the Achaemenid Empire, including the use of the royal road network. Ultimately, the article argues that Abrokomas’ movements were not marked by hesitation, but reflect the King’s flexible and multi-directional strategy to contain Cyrus’ advance, culminating in the confrontation at Cunaxa (401 BC). The actions and misdirections of Abrokomas contributed to shaping the campaign’s outcome, and the article provides a reassessment of his reputation and of Persian defensive planning in the face of internal rebellion.