Mandatory preventive vaccinations and the formal premise of the limitation clause of constitutional rights and freedoms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15584/actaires.2021.4.19Keywords:
mandatory preventive vaccinations, ex lege obligation, statutory exclusivity, limiting constitutional rights and freedomsAbstract
The obligation to subject oneself or a child to preventive vaccinations may undoubtedly be perceived as a restriction in the sphere of the constitutional right to decide about one’s personal life (Art. 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). However, this interference becomes permissible taking into account the general limitation clause resulting from Art. 31 sec. 3 of the Constitution. Apart from the criteria of a material nature, the general clause specifying the premises for limiting constitutional rights and freedoms requires a statutory form of restriction. In view of placing some solutions regarding the vaccination obligation in the executive regulation and the Protective Vaccination Program, doubts arose as to the compliance of the provisions of the vaccination obligation with the formal condition for placing it in the act. The aim of this article is an attempt to answer the question whether the legislator meets this premise. On the basis of the analysis of the normative material, jurisprudence and views of the doctrine, it is legitimate to state that the currently binding legal solutions correspond to the principle of exclusive statutory form of limiting constitutional rights and freedoms.