Politics of incoherence – British military political plans towards the Middle East in 1956

Abstract

In the decade after WWII, as Great Britain struggled to secure its diminishing empire with belt-tightening measures at home, it found time to get involved in a war in Egypt. British politics was in a state of flux, with a new generation of leaders emerging to preside over belated postwar prosperity. But when Winston Churchill resigned as PM in 1955, he was succeeded by Anthony Eden – the last PM to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved she was not. In July 1956, the last Tommy pulled out of the Canal Zone. On July 26, President Gammal Abdel Nasser abruptly announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The British PM was outraged and, riding a wave of popular indignation, prepared a grotesquely disproportionate response: a full scale invasion on Egypt or Israel! The greatest irony of the Suez operation was that it was totally counterproductive. Far from bolstering Anglo-French interests, it badly undermined the political and military prestige of both countries. Though Eden scarcely seemed to appreciate this fact, GB was simply no longer capable of mounting a solo imperial military action. On that occasion GB did not want, but just needed Israeli support. In operation Musketeer, British soldiers fought alongside their French and Israeli counterparts. More importantly, GB saw itself not for what it was: a declining and weakened power. This withdrawal was a crushing defeat for the Allies, especially for Britain and France who now had to face their own realities. GB was to only play a menial role supporting the United States’ proxy wars and diplomatic ventures. It could not take on the Soviet Union itself. Instead, Britain looked to the US for guidance and leadership, a development previously thought laughable. The Suez Crisis changed everything – Britain suffered humiliation at the hands of a minor power.